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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
ATTORNEY

AND

CENSED--WHETHER

CLIENT-PRACTITIONERS
REAL

ESTATE BROKERS

NOT ADMITTED on NOT LiSELECTING

AND

COMPLETING

PREPARED FORMS AS INCIDENT TO CLOSING REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS IN
WHICH THEY ARE ACTING AS BROKERS ARE PRACTICING LAw-That the

stresses of great economic expansion tend to expose latent problems has
been demonstrated repeatedly. Hence, it is not surprising that such a

problem, one inherent in the real estate brokerage profession, has recently
reappeared in the form of the case of Arkansas Bar Association v. Block.1
The plaintiff in that case, representing attorneys as a class, brought
suit against the defendant, representing real estate brokers as a class, for
a declaration that real estate brokers, when engaged in filling out prepared forms incident to the closing of real estate transactions, were practicing law, notwithstanding that such forms had previously been approved
by attorneys, had been selected in accordance with the expressed desires
of the principals concerned, and the brokers were, in fact, acting solely as
brokers, with no additional charge being made. The case was heard on an
agreed statement of facts which permitted of a precise definition of the
issues. The trial court held that the activities complained of were incident
to the regular course of the brokerage business and were, therefore, not
the practice of law. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed
and held that the elicitation, consideration, evaluation and selection involved constituted the practice of law2 except as to the preparation of in-

struments of offer and acceptance which contemplate the preparation of
additional instruments prior to the completion of the transaction.
The problem is not new but, like the revival of an old favorite on the
stage, the scenery and the actors are. As in revivals of classic plays, the
latest performance can be isolated and evaluated by itself, but competent
actors, like courts, generally acquit themselves in workmanlike manner,
their interpretation being sound from the standpoint of the effect sought
to be achieved. To carry the simile but a step further, perhaps the better

basis of evaluation is a comparison of other interpretations of the same
script by other casts. The instant case has had its counterpart adjudicated
in other forums with both the same and opposite results. But to say
there have been only two interpretations would be a gross over-simplification, since the reasoning supporting those results has been varied indeed.
The very fact that a relatively well-defined issue lends itself to such a
variety of treatment by courts applying law, generally similar in back1- Ark. -, 323 S. W. (2d) 912 (1959), cert. den. 361 U. S. 836, 80 S. Ct. 87,
4 L. Ed. (2d) 76 (1959).
2 People v. People's Stock Yards Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931) ; In re
Opinion of Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N. E. 313 (1935); People v. Alfani, 227 N. Y.
334, 125 N. E. 671 (1919) ; In re Duncan, 83 S. C. 186, 95 S. E. 210, 24 I R. A.
(N. S.) 750 (1909).
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ground and development, under reasonably similar circumstances, is
provocative of the question, why? That question is not answered by dissection of the reasoning and the niceties of the individual result because, having thus determined the "true rule," adverse reflection is cast on the competence of other forums, and moreover, too many other forums. Such
variety, under the circumstances, cannot reasonably be achieved by mere
application, or misapplication, of "true rules," but is more logically the
product of broader considerations to which a given forum responds in
the light of its own experience and environment.
To illustrate, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in the nearly identical
case of Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Company v. Denver Bar Association,3 was in accord with the Supreme Court of Arkansas that the practices
complained of amounted to the practice of law but they refused to enjoin
the practitioners, as prayed, and dismissed the complaint. The case is
particularly important and significant to the instant discussion since the
court there did not shilly-shally but boldly announced that, in Colorado,
there were broader considerations to which the court would respond,
to-wit: public convenience. The reasoning proceeded on the ground that
real estate brokers, whose business was both lawful and important, had
been completing such instruments for almost fifty years; that the legislature, comprised of persons from all walks of life, with full knowledge of
the practice, had not seen fit specifically to take action; that actual injury
to any member of the public had not been shown; and that the public
had chosen to conduct its affairs in that manner and still had a choice that
it was free to exercise. The result, therefore, was substantially opposite
to that in Arkansas, yet it is this opposition, operating on a fact situation
of agreed legal significance, that dramatizes the idea that in the area of
law practice the courts feel less reluctant to pronounce policy.
Nor does the Arkansas decision itself detract from this idea. Having
decided that the conduct of real estate brokers, as stipulated, amounted
to the practice of law, the Supreme Court of Arkansas excepted from its
holding the same conduct as applied to offers and acceptances on the
ground that such instruments contemplated subsequent documentary preparation before completion of the transaction. While this expression has the
ring of logic, it is difficult to understand how legal rights become less fixed
in an enforceable contract than they do in a so-called final document.
An equally valid explanation might be that the court chose to follow a
well supported line of reasoning until that course transgressed its concept
of public convenience.
0135 Colo. 398, 312 P. (2d) 998 (1957).
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In the case of Cowern v. Nelson,4 the Supreme Court of Minnesota
frankly remarked that it was its duty to regulate the practice of law in a
common-sense way to afford protection to the public and yet not unduly
burden legitimate business with technical restraints. It described a gray
area of dual function between the practice of law and the activities of
brokers. However, that court condemned, as a species of practice of law,
the same activities by the same brokers where separate compensation was
involved or where the activity was outside of or independent from a brokerage transaction. In the case of Hulse v. Criger,5 the Supreme Court of
Missouri pointed to the fact that, while the real estate broker earns his
commission when the buyer is found, as a practical matter he does not
collect it until the deal is closed and, therefore, acts in part in his own
interest. Further, it was in the interest of those he represented to have
contracts concluded, particularly contracts drawn. on the spot, and that
so much brokerage business had been done with so little harm resulting,
that the public interest was best served by preserving the situation as it
stood. Again, however, the court, when delineating the sanctioned area of
brokerage activity, excluded the preparation of all but present, direct
conveyances on "standard" forms. 6 It distinguished these from specially
drafted documents and from those conveying more complicated estates,
such as those subject to contingencies. In view of the variety of rights
that can be created by insertions in "standard" printed forms, this distinction seems unique. Similarly, it has been held that the practice of
law was not involved where the conduct was incident to the business of
the person complained about" or where the documents were "simple.''s
An additional criterion has sometimes been the question of whether or not
the draftsman merely acted as a clerk in writing down the requests of his
principals.9
4 207 Minn. 642, 290 N. W. 795 (1940).

5363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W. (2d) 855 (1952).
6 It is interesting to note that the court making these pronouncements did so in a
case which held that a real estate broker who prepared documents not incident to
a brokerage transaction and for compensation was engaged in practicing law. See
note 12, post.
7 Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934) ; Northampton County Bar Ass'n
v. Young, 1 Mon. L. R. 94, 26 North. Co. 363 (Pa., 1938). Statements to the same
effect appear in Merick v. American Security & Trust Co., 107 F. (2d) 271 (1939),
cert. den. 308 U. S.625, 60 S.Ct. 380, 84 L. Ed. 521 (1940), and in People v. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666 (1919).
8 Gustafson v. V. C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St. 392, 20 Ohio Op. 484, 35
N. E. (2d) 435 (1941). See also the dictum in the cases of Re Eastern Idaho Loan
& Trust Co., 49 Ida. 280, 288 P. 157, 73 A. L. R. 1323 (1930), and Cain v. Merchants
National Bank & Trust Co., 66 N. D. 746, 268 N. W. 719 (1936).
9 See, for example, People v. Sipper, 61 Cal. App. (2d) 844, 142 P. (2d) 960
(1943); Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co., 303 Ky. 493, 197 S. W. (2d) 454 (1946) ;
State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 268 N. W. 95 (1936). In the case of
LaBrum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A. (2d) 246 (1948), the court
purported to make a distinction between practicing and conveyancing.
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If the practice of law was wholly a matter of definition, courts would
logically treat conduct objectively since it is the conduct itself that is
subject to definition unaffected by extrinsic circumstances. The fact that
courts are not insensible to the environment producing the conduct leads
irresistibly to the conclusion that courts are not dealing with definitions
alone, but are prescribing rules. As a result, analysis of the cases, while
interesting, is productive of little more than an indication of the attitude
of the individual jurisdictions toward the regulation of the practice of law.
Some instances would appear to limit this conclusion. In those cases,
the courts would more nearly seem to be defining conduct per se. For
example, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of People ex rel. Illinois
State Bar Association v. Schafer,0 has said that if real estate brokers
elicit facts and consider, advise or act thereon, they are in all probability
practicing law. In the Florida case of Keyes Company v. Dade County
Bar Association,"' the brokerage activity was described as preliminary only,
so the subsequent selection of forms or the filling in of blanks therein was
a species of practice of law. However, even in those instances, the courts
viewed the conduct from the standpoint of public protection so it is at
least consonant with their pronouncements that they, too, were regulating
law practice.
No criticism is intended by this conclusion for it is the inherent prerogative of the judiciary to so regulate.' 2 In considering the problem
generally, however, it is an important preliminary to understand that
there is no universally applicable measure available. It remains, therefore, to isolate those considerations which have prevailed in the various
jurisdictions and to appraise their potential persuasiveness for the future.
The prime consideration has, of course, been the degree of protection
afforded the public. In this connection, it has been pointed out that real
estate titles are complex and are likely to become more complex in the
future ;13 that brokers, as a matter of requirement or exposure, may be
10404 Ill. 45, 87 N. E. (2d) 773 (1949).
1146 So. (2d) 605 (Fla., 1950).
12 In re Opinion of Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N. E. 313 (1935) ; New Jersey
State Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey Mortgage Ass'n, 55 N. J. Super. 230, 150 A.
(2d) 496 (1959). The idea of judicial prerogative offers a possible explanation for
the fact that courts have, collaterally to the issues for decision, laid down rules
relating to the practice of law which have later been respected as binding: Hulse v.
Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S. W. (2d) 247 S. W. (2d) 855 (1952) ; Childs v. Smeltzer,
315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934) ; Northampton County Bar Ass'n v. Young, 1 Mon. L. R.
94, 26 North. Co. 363 (Pa., 1938).
18 People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Association v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N. E.
(2d) 773 (1949). See particularly, the concurring opinion in Washington State Bar
Ass'n v. Washington Association of Realtors, 41 Wash. (2d) 697, 251 P. (2d) 619
(1952).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

familiar with the mechanics of real estate transactions but are likely to
fall far short, as protectors, of the legal profession wherein the members,
in addition to possessing essential skill and knowledge, stand in a position
of trust to both courts and clients and are bound by a system of canons of
14
professional ethics.
Absent from the cases is any indication that wide-spread harm has
resulted from brokers pursuing the activities complained about. While
that absence is far from conclusive, it is a consideration not without some
weight. Public convenience, which can include the element of additional
expense, has been an influence and the fact that the public has continuously spurned the protection available has been viewed as a realistic factor. 15 The interests of attorneys in their proprietary capacity have obviously, if silently, been considered. It would appear, as a very real and
practical matter, that the activities of real estate brokers in the disputed
area have made substantial inroads into a prime source of law business. It
has not always been a satisfactory answer that the source has been continually denied to them. 16 In a very real sense, the area defined is a
competitive one and attorneys, bound by the ethics of their profession,
must fight in the only arena available to them, i.e., the courtroom.
Almost without exception, 17 courts have not permitted brokers to
capitalize on that handicap by allowing them to charge for the disputed
services. Nevertheless, the interests of brokers have been accorded due
consideration. Nearly all jurisdictions' 8 have, by some process, conceded
that brokers may draw the contract underlying the real estate transaction,
thus giving substance to the argument that delay in obtaining the services
of an attorney at the crucial, and perhaps peculiar, moment of agreement
would make the broker's position sufficiently tenuous to work real financial
14

State Bar Ass'n of Connecticut v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,

140 A. (2d) 863 (1959).
15 Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312
P. (2d) 998 (1957) ; Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N. W.
(2d) 713,53 A. L. R. (2d) 777 (1955).
16 Commonwealth v. Jones & Robbins, 186 Va. 30, 41 S. E. (2d) 720 (1947).
17 In re Matthews, 58 Ida. 772, 79 P. (2d) 535 (1938), is one exception. The court
there also distinguished the filling in of blanks from "preparation" of the instrument which, it said, involved something more.
18 Notable exceptions are to be found in In re Gore, 58 Ohio App. 79, 11 Ohio Op.
495, 151 N. E. (2d) 968 (1937) ; Gustafson v. Jestrat, 17 Ohio Op. 83, 31 Ohio L. Abs.
123 (1940).
See also Collacott Realty, Inc. v. Homuth, 13 Ohio Op. 250, 28 Ohio
L. Abs. 211 (1939). However, the case of Gustafson v. V. C. Taylor & Sons, Inc.,
138 Ohio St. 392, 20 Ohio Op. 484, 35 N. E. (2d) 435 (1941), which held that the
act of a broker in supplying the date, price, name of purchaser, location of property,
date of possession, and duration of the offer, In a contract form drafted by an attorney especially for that broker's particular operation, was not practicing law, appears
to be an apparent limitation on the earlier Ohio cases.
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harm.19 Much less effect has been given the argument that the broker
is typically paid when the transaction is closed, regardless of the time
when the commission is earned, and that it is a matter of practical expediency that he should control the transaction to its conclusion.
Against the background of the present increased activity of the real
estate market and the admittedly long-continued practice of brokers in
the selection and completion of prepared forms incident to the closing of
real estate transactions, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has spoken and
thus appraised the public interest while resolving the proprietary conflict
between brokers and attorneys. It is apparent that the circumstances presented are not peculiar to Arkansas so it is not illogical to suggest that
similar controversies will arise, either again or for the first time, in other
jurisdictions. The significance of the instant decision lies in the fact that
it is the latest one. Since it has viewed all considerations in the light of
the expanded activity, it behooves potential parties to similar disputes,
including the courts which will hear them, to ponder the reasons for this
pronouncement.
Real estate brokers might well consider the obvious fact that, without
regard to the reasons supporting their activity, they are competing with
attorneys. They might well carefully weigh their own convenience and
necessities against the possible alienation of a prominent segment of society, with a view toward diminishing, where possible, the area of conflict.
Attorneys, on the other hand, would do well to evaluate the possibility that
the public will construe their attitude as a manifestation of selfishness or
greed; understandably so since the public will ultimately have to pay
for any change. Despite this, attorneys should not forget that it remains
their responsibility to originate dispute when the public interest is threatened. Since the embers of controversy are continually being fanned by
economic pressures, it would be well for both sides, in consideration of
public as well as private interests, on their own initiative, to adopt some
common-sense policies to prevent, or at least to mitigate, future flare-ups.
L. D. SNOW

HUSBAND AND WIF--CONVEYANCES TO HUSBAND AND WIFE-WHETHER
THE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF REAL ESTATE OWNED IN JOINT TENANCY

BY HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE ALSO HELD IN JOINT TENANcY-The question
of whether the proceeds from the sale of land held in joint tenancy were
also held in joint tenancy was presented to an Illinois reviewing court for
19Ingham County Bar Association v. Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N. W. (2d)
713, 53 A. L. R. (2d) 777 (1955) ; Caneer v. Martin, 238 S. W. (2d) 828 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1951).

